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Proponents of the research credibility movement make a number of recommendations 
to enhance research rigour in psychology. These represent positive advances and can enhance 
replicability in clinical psychological science. This article evaluates whether there are any 
risks associated with this movement. We argue that there is the potential for research 
credibility principles to stifle innovation and exacerbate type II error, but only if they are 
applied too rigidly and beyond their intended scope by funders, journals and scientists. We 
outline ways to mitigate these risks. Further, we discuss how research credibility issues need 
to be situated within broader concerns about research waste. A failure to optimise the process 
by which basic science findings are used to inform the development of novel treatments (the 
first translational gap) and effective  treatments are then implemented in real-world settings  
(the second translational gap) are also significant sources of research waste in depression. We 







 In the past ten years there has been a growing recognition that many findings fail to 
replicate in psychology, which is in part driven by the widespread use of questionable 
research practices (QRPs) that inflate type I errors (i.e. false positives). A series of practical 
meta-science proposals have been put forward about how the rigour of psychological science 
can be enhanced (which can be referred to as the research credibility movement). These 
proposals are now being extended from the basic science arena to other domains of applied 
psychology including clinical psychology. This is a timely, important and useful change that 
may greatly benefit the field. However, as with most change, there could be risks as well as 
opportunities depending on how these recommendations are implemented.   
This article will identify possible risks in implementing research credibility 
recommendations in clinical psychological science, consider how likely these are to occur, 
and discuss ways to mitigate against them.  We use intervention development in depression 
as a focus to illustrate these points.  We argue there is a risk that the research credibility 
movement may inhibit innovation and exacerbate type II error in the field if its principles are 
applied in a rigid, “one size fits all” way that goes beyond their intended scope and fails to 
take into account the context in which clinical psychology operates. We will then suggest that 
research credibility priorities in clinical psychology need to be situated within broader 
concerns about research waste. Pragmatically, the central aim of clinical psychological 
science is to develop effective means of preventing or treating mental health difficulties. 
Efficient research practices are those that optimise the quality, validity and speed, and 
minimise the cost (in every sense), of this treatment development pathway. While issues of 
rigour do need to be addressed in clinical psychology, the bigger problem is a failure to 
optimise this translational research pipeline. We will discuss how key areas of waste in the 
field are produced due to sub-optimal translation of findings from basic science into novel 
treatments (the t1 gap) and a failure to implement treatments shown to be effective in 
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controlled trials in real world settings (the t2 gap) (Cooksey, 2006). We will suggest ways to 
enhance the efficiency of this translational pipeline.   
We take a UK perspective, identifying what we see as challenges for research 
credibility and efficiency in the context of the UK National Health Service and research 
funding bodies. We are aware that many but not all of the issues we raise will apply globally 
and should therefore be considered within each national context.  
 
Emergence of the research credibility movement 
 
 It is increasingly recognised that many key findings in science generally, and 
psychology specifically, fail to replicate (e.g., Ionnidis, 2005; Chalmers & Glasizou, 2009; 
Open Science Collaboration; 2015; Camerer et al., 2018). Over 90% of respondents to a 
recent Nature survey agreed that there was a ‘reproducibility crisis’ across science (Baker, 
2016). The endemic use of questionable research practices (QRPs) has also become apparent, 
which can lead to spurious false positive findings in basic psychological science (Simmons et 
al, 2011). At the design stage, these include chronic under-powering (Fraley & Vazire, 2014; 
Button et al., 2013) and inadequate protocol specification. At the data-collection stage, 
adaptive stopping rules are sometimes used (ceasing data collection when effects become 
significant). At the analysis stage, questionable practices include measure-hacking, p-hacking 
and selective exclusion (e.g., Ioannidis et al, 2014; Flake & Fried, submitted). At the write-up 
phase, problematic approaches include hypothesizing after the results are known, spin and 
providing insufficient detail to enable replication (Kerr, 1988; Glasizou et al., 2014). At the 
publication phase, there are ‘file drawer’ and citation bias problems (e.g., Ingre & Nilsonne, 
2018). These QRPs until recently were seen as acceptable standard practice, were 
incentivized by the grant and publication reward structures, and most likely contributed to 
low rates of replicability in the field.  
 5 
Clinical psychology research is not immune to these problems (e.g., Perepletchikova, 
Treat & Kazdin, 2008). Cuijpers and Cristea (2015) in a ‘tongue in cheek’ article discuss 
ways that may be (intentionally or unintentionally) used to prove a novel therapy is effective, 
even when it is not. These include: allegiance biases leading to enhanced  supervision and 
training for the preferred therapy (Munder et al., 2013); maximising expectancy effects for 
the preferred treatment; exploiting weak spots in trial methodologies to favour the preferred 
treatment (e.g. selection of a ‘straw-man’ comparator, preferential allocation to treatment 
arm, non-blinded assessment, focusing on completer not intention-to-treat data, measure and 
p-hacking); and running small trials and only publishing the ones that work. Similar use of 
QRPs in clinical psychology and psychiatry research have been identified by other authors 
(Liechsenring et al., 2018; Reardon et al., 2018; DeVries et al., 2018; Turner et al., 2008).  
In response to these concerns, a number of recommendations have been made about 
how to improve rigour and replicability in science (e.g., Munafo et al., 2017). These include: 
training in good methods to minimise QRPs; encouraging protocol pre-registration and/or 
registered reports; incentivising replication; ensuring studies are adequately powered; and 
strengthening the peer review process to ensure that it more rigorously detects bad practices 
(e.g., Munafo et al., 2017). Ways to adapt these recommendations to clinical psychological 
science have also been considered (Hopwood & Vazire, 2018; Tackett et al., 2018).  
We wholeheartedly endorse these recommendations. However, we wish to raise some 
risks to innovation in science if these principles are over-rigidly applied, particularly to 
clinical fields where there is still significant uncertainty about how to operationalise and 
measure phenomena of interest. We begin by outlining what is required to maximise 




Striking a balance between creativity and rigour in science 
There is a long theoretical tradition considering how to optimise scientific 
development and innovation. This highlights a synergy (and sometimes inevitable tension) 
that exists between maximising creativity and preserving rigour (see reviews by 
Wagenmakers, Dutilh & Sarafoglou, 2018; Fiedler, 2018). Whewell (1840) proposed two 
mutually reinforcing modes of reasoning: inductive reasoning that generates a new creative 
leap, and deductive reasoning that then tests whether the leap was justified (i.e. the deduction 
verifies the induction).  More recently, Kelly (1955a and 1955b) described two essential 
components of creativity: ‘loosening’ (breaking out of the shackles of existing knowledge 
and rules, developing unconventional ideas that go against the zeitgeist) and ‘tightening’ 
(critical evaluation, selection and then implementation of the ideas generated by ‘loosening’).  
Optimal scientific development arguably involves striking a considered balance 
between (and appropriately sequencing) these inductive-loosening and deductive-tightening 
processes (Kaufman & Glaveanu, 2018). There must be space to engage in both induction 
and deduction, with induction tending to occur first to generate the input to the deductive 
process. When engaging in deductive, tightening processes, the optimal balance also needs to 
be struck between protecting from type I error (a false positive finding) and type II error (a 
false negative finding) and between ensuring internal validity (the experiment is free from 
error and any difference in measurement is due solely to the independent variable) and 
external validity (i.e. generalisability beyond experiment) of findings. As is well known, there 
is a trade-off between each of these (attempts to reduce type I error can enhance type II error; 
attempts to maximise internal validity can reduce external validity).  
 Having outlined the factors that maximise innovation in science, we will focus now 
evaluate the thesis that an overly rigid application of the research credibility movement could 
lead to some unanticipated costs. In particular, we will assess whether it could stifle 
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innovation and tilt the balance too far in the favour of protecting against type I error (and 
therefore maximise type II error). It is important to acknowledge we are predominantly 
focusing on risks rather than possible benefits of the research credibility movement in what 
follows. We are taking this ‘one-sided’ stance because others have already written eloquently 
about the positives associated with a thoughtful application of research rigour principals (e.g., 
Munafo et al., 2017; Hopwood & Vazire, 2018), while the negatives of an extreme 
application have rarely been explicitly evaluated. Our intention is to contribute to a dialectical 
synthesis around the merits of research credibility principles and to promote a balanced 
implementation in the field.  In the following sections we will focus on depression 
intervention research to illustrate these risks.  
 
The State of the Depression Field 
 Depression remains a chronic, recurrent, prevalent condition that is a major cause of 
disability despite extensive research efforts (Kessler et al., 2003; Ustun et al., 2004). Current 
psychological treatments for depression are only partially effective (with high rates of non-
response or relapse after response; Cuijpers et al., 2008; Vittengl et al., 2007). It is not clear 
that current treatments are always superior to placebo-control when unpublished trials are 
taken into account (Cuijpers et al., 2014a, 2014b). There is uncertainty about whether 
therapies work by the distinct mechanisms their developers postulated (e.g. for cognitive-
behavioural therapy, see Longmore & Worrell, 2007; Lorenzo-Luaces, German & DeRubeis, 
2018) and there is debate about whether instead therapy ‘non-specific’ factors are driving 
improvement (Cuijpers, Reijnders & Huiber, 2018).  
There has been a proliferation of different evidence-based treatments that appear to be 
equally effective, albeit with variation across treatments in the extent of their evidence-bases. 
Arguably, there have been no step-wise gains in the capacity to treat acute depression in the 
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past thirty years (Dunn & Roberts, 2016). There is an urgent need for treatment innovation 
and implementation.  
It is unclear if this failure to differentiate treatments is due to genuine equivalence of 
efficacy, or to heterogeneity in depression. There is significant variability in the clinical 
presentation of depression, with approximately 1000 unique symptom combinations all 
leading to the same diagnosis (Fried & Nesse, 2016). Moreover, there is marked variation 
across the disease life span as a function of severity, chronicity, number of previous episodes, 
and previous treatment response (‘staging’ variables; Lorenzo-Lucaes, 2018). There are also 
distinct differences in patterns of comorbidity (Hasin et al., 2018). As a result, the adequacy 
of the current diagnostic system has been increasingly challenged (e.g., Insel et al., 2010; 
Fried et al., 2017; Borsboom, 2017; Hoffmann, Curtis & McNally, 2016) and difficulties in 
knowing how to best measure depression have been highlighted (Fried, 2017; Fried & Nesse, 
2016; Fried et al., 2016). This heterogeneity is not only limited to client characteristics. There 
is also variability in how competently individual therapists deploy complex therapy protocols 
to treat depression (Saxon, Firth & Barkham, 2017) and how well these are implemented 
between different settings (Clark et al., 2018).  
Given this heterogeneity, it is unsurprising that there has been a failure to find clear 
differences between treatments, or that treatments fail to be reliably superior to placebo. This 
is exacerbated in subsequent meta-analyses, which only partly control for heterogeneity 
between trials and do not take into account within-trial heterogeneity (for a balanced critique 
of meta-analyses, see Serghiou & Goodman, 2018). The results is that there is a danger in 
simply accepting the null in these trials. However, such a conclusion would ignore the 
possibility that different treatments are more effective for particular subtypes of clinical 
presentations, in particular contexts, or when delivered in targeted ways.  
 9 
To move the depression field forwards, it is critical to gain a better understanding of 
boundary conditions between treatments, to help answer what works for whom and when. For 
example, an increasing body of work is now examining treatment selection in depression (for 
example, DeRubeis et al., 2014). Some of this work, using novel application of machine 
learning approaches, is beginning to reveal that even when trials show no difference between 
treatments in an overall sample, there can nevertheless be significant differences in treatment 
outcomes in particular subgroups (Lorenzo-Luaces et al., 2018; Cohen & Derubeis, 2018).  
In many ways, the depression field, despite ancient historical roots, has many of the 
features of what Rozin (2001) calls a ‘young’ science. Rozin points out it is helpful for a 
young science to begin by identifying, conceptualising and learning how to measure 
underlying phenomena of interest. Ideally these are homogeneous and invariant (i.e. present 
in a similar way across individuals and contexts). These early phases are more descriptive 
and/or exploratory. Only once these steps have been achieved should there be a move to more 
‘mature’ scientific methods that follow a confirmatory approach (using experimental methods 
to test clear hypotheses).  
Depression research using deductive methods is vulnerable to the QRPs and 
replication issues identified by the research credibility movement (e.g., Turner et al., 2008; 
DeVries et al., 2018). However, the primary problem the depression treatment field faces is a 
lack of innovation of novel treatments that are then worthy of rigorous examination using 
these deductive methods. Moreover, when conducting deductive research there is a danger of 
a tilting the balance too much to protect against type I error rate (and therefore exacerbating 
type II error rate). We evaluate whether an overly rigid application of the recommendations 
of the research credibility movement could exacerbate these problems.  
 
Potential risks of an extreme application of research credibility principles 
 Evaluating risks identified in the broader basic science literature 
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 A recent symposium in Perspectives in Psychological Science debated the impact of 
research credibility principles on creativity in research and (alongside a number of likely 
benefits) identified a series of risks. ‘Tightening’ of research practices could result in: a 
reduction in the number of studies conducted because of increased workload required by new 
policies (Wai & Halpern, 2018); an over-emphasis on methods and analysis leading to an 
under-emphasis on theory construction (Fiedler, 2018); and researchers being increasingly 
reluctant to pursue ‘risky’ questions (Vazire, 2018). As a result there could be a shift towards 
‘little c creativity’ (where scientists incrementally develop the current dominant theory rather 
than bring about paradigm shifts; Kuhn, 1962).  
 Of these concerns, we see a particular risk for clinical-psychological science with 
regards to prioritising theory construction that underpins subsequent treatment development. 
Popper (2005) articulated how initial theory development is often an inductive process that 
precedes formal scientific testing, but nevertheless is a rigorous process. In the early phases 
of research, scientists are guided by intuition or imagination, which they then subject to a 
process of rational criticism to begin to refine a theory iteratively. What is essential to this 
creative thinking is the coupling of imaginative freedom, a capacity to engage in highly 
critical thinking about the products of this imaginative freedom, and an intense interest in the 
problem (so the scientist is willing to immerse themselves in the issue and go through repeat 
iterations before they come up with the best account). What typically occurs is an iterative 
cycle between hypothesis, test and reflection (in relation to extant theory and literature), 
which ends when the optimal account is generated (i.e. the most consistent and powerfully 
explanatory model has been built). This is similar to the test-operate-test-exit (TOTE) cycle 
believed to guide behaviour in early cybernetic theory (Miller, Gallanter & Pribram, 1960). 
At times, each loop of this cycle can refine and simplify the problem space (Newell & Simon, 
1972) in a linear fashion At other times, fresh information may be introduced into the system 
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that requires a new (and potentially non-linear) inductive leap to take place to be to account 
for it. This refinement of ideas prior to formal testing  has been described by later writers as 
the ‘pursuit’ phase, where a theory-sketch has been generated but is not yet sufficiently well 
specified to be tested using formal scientific methods (see Chakrabarty, 2010). We need to 
ensure that this process of theory generation prior to empirical testing continues to be 
legitimised and scientists are given time and space to engage in it.   
Relatedly, there is a risk that the field sees the only valid source of information for the 
development of theories that underpin psychological interventions as being basic science 
laboratory data. We are in danger of increasingly viewing therapy in purely scientific terms 
as value-free techniques, failing to take into account the social, economic, and political roots 
from which they emerged (Marks, 2017). For example, cognitive-behavioural perspectives 
were strongly influenced by stoicism – the idea that we are disturbed not by things but our 
view of things (Evans, 2012). The emergence of CBT also coincided with the cognitive 
revolution in other areas of science and the emergence of computing (Miller, 2003). Not all 
of these broader influences are easily reduced into testable experiments to run in the 
laboratory. We need to preserve a broad set of influences on our theorising, with 
experimental evidence being a key, but not the sole, source of theory development. 
Moreover, a theory should be evaluated not solely on the basis of how well it generates 
testable hypothesises that can be deductively examined in the laboratory but also the extent to 
which it and serves as a set of ‘guiding principles’ to inform clinical management in real-
world settings. This echoes Lewin’s views about the importance of ensuring a good theory is 
applicable (Lewin, 1943; 1951).  
We will now consider a range of additional risks of an overly rigid application of 
research credibility principles. 
Risk 1: Inhibiting Accidental Discovery 
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 A risk of rigid implementation of the research credibility movement is that it may 
inhibit accidental discovery. The history of medicine is replete with examples of 
serendipitous discoveries revolutionizing practice (Ban, 2006). For example, Flemming first 
identified penicillin when a staphylococcus sample became contaminated and developed a 
mould culture that inhibited subsequent bacteria growth. The psychotropic effects of many 
drugs subsequently used to treat mental health were also discovered by accident, including 
lithium, tricyclic antidepressants, and monoamine oxidase inhibitors.  
A strong form of this argument is that nearly all of the significant advances in our 
field were of this accidental form and very few emerged from a pure application of the 
deductive scientific method. We do not endorse this strong form. While accidental and free 
discovery should be enabled, it is also overstating the case to say that good discoveries only 
come about by these means. We do think that a theory driven ‘experimental 
psychopathology’ approach has delivered advances in clinical psychology (e.g. see Clark, 
2004; Salkovskis, 2002).  Moreover, even in the case of free or accidental discoveries, it is of 
course then essential to test them robustly.  
 Risk 2: Over-interpreting non-replications as true negative findings 
A rigid application of research credibility principles could lead to overly simplistic 
thinking about how to interpret non-replications. The underlying assumption behind attempts 
to replicate is that there is a univariate, homogeneous phenomenon that can be measured and 
manipulated in a pure fashion. This may be possible in a basic biomedical science field. 
However, the complex psychological phenomena studied in clinical psychology are typically 
‘bounded’ by person and context (Rozin, 2001), making direct replication (repeating the 
experiment in exactly the same way and seeing if the effects hold) virtually impossible. 
Instead, it is more realistic to aim for conceptual replications (varying aspects of the 
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experiment to see if the effects still hold; typically different settings or different subjects) (cf., 
Zwann, 2018).  
Taking too narrow a view of replication in clinical psychology could lead to the 
dismissal of  all ‘near miss phenomena’ (i.e. an interesting effect that is not significant in a 
priori planned analyses but is in some secondary ones) or results that do not fully replicate 
(i.e. effects that are found in one sample but not another). It is a logical error to conclude 
these ‘near misses’ are always ‘true negatives’ that are not worthy of further exploration. In 
particular, it may be that they are legitimate findings that are bounded by participant 
characteristics and context (and clarifying these boundary conditions is of value to the field).  
Of course, some findings in the present literature will be ‘true negatives’ that emerge from 
questionable practice and it would be a waste of resource to look for boundary effects of 
these phenomena. Balanced rather than extreme application of research credibility principles 
should be helpful in this regard, as over time the frequency of these ‘true negatives’ in the 
literature should reduce as QRPs are gradually eliminated and the field as a result will be able 
to have greater confidence in the findings that emerge in each individual study that is 
published.  
 Risk 3: Devaluing descriptive and exploratory analyses 
An overly strict interpretation of research credibility recommendations regarding pre-
registration could devalue descriptive and exploratory data analysis. It is already challenging 
to publish work of this kind in the field. For example, we rarely see in leading psychology 
journals work that clearly acknowledges its descriptive or exploratory origins and there is a 
pressure to provide a clean, narrative story that makes all analyses conducted seem as a 
priori, linear tests of a pre-determined nature (e.g., hypothesizing after the results are known 
[HARK-ing]; Kerr et al., 1983). If journals and reviewers apply simplistic binary decision 
rules to pre-registration (i.e. rejecting research that is not pre-registered,deviates in even 
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small ways from pre-registered protocols, or is not clearly deductive in nature) this could 
exacerbate the problem. A new ‘file drawer’ problem may emerge where descriptive and 
exploratory findings are never publishable.  
This would be a pity, as in our experience descriptive and exploratory analyses can be 
an extremely productive phase of research, particularly for ‘young’ sciences in need of 
innovation (Rozin, 2001). A specific example of the value of descriptive approaches is 
provided by Skinner (1955) when writing about the trajectory of scientific discovery over his 
career.  Core to his early work was careful description and characterisation of sometimes 
unexpected observations about the conditions in which in animal did or did not learn a 
behavioural contingency, without any need to be guided by or attempt to test a pre-specified 
learning theory (Skinner, 1949). Each of these observations was followed up rigorously but 
not solely by use of deductive hypothesis testing.  
A criticism of exploratory analyses are that they are merely ‘fishing expeditions’. 
However, at their best these analyses are often an iterative, theory informed discovery 
process that is both inductive and deductive in nature. The researcher observes an unexpected 
pattern of data, generates a revised or novel theory and set of hypotheses to account for this 
unexpected pattern, then conducts further analyses to test this theory. Through immersion in 
the data and becoming familiar with its constraints and possibilities, this can facilitate 
creativity and ‘flow’ that help to bring about new understandings to complex problems. As 
with initial theory generation, this typically follows a rapid TOTE cycle (Miller et al., 1960), 
which ends when the optimal explanation of the data are reached. If the analysis protocol had 
to be registered and new data prospectively collected to test it at each phase of this iterative 
discovery process, this would interrupt creative flow and significantly slow down evolution 
of that line of work.  
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Our hope and expectation, however, is that these risks regarding pre-registration will 
not materialise. Advocates of the credibility movement do clearly say that there is a place for 
exploratory, post hoc research as long as it is properly reported (Frankenhuis & Nettle, 2018).  
Moreover, there has been a move away from a binary distinction of research either being 
confirmatory or exploratory, to recognising there is a continuum. There is now increasing 
flexibility in the kind of pre-registration that can be completed (Nosek et al., 2018), for 
example allowing some data-driven decisions to be made (but encouraging people to 
articulate how these decisions will be made a priori) and also allowing pre-registration of 
secondary analysis protocols. Similarly, there is no reason not to encourage pre-registration 
of purely descriptive studies. If these more flexible kinds of pre-registration are widely 
adopted by journals and reviewers this may legitimise rather than inhibit well-conducted 
descriptive and exploratory research.  
Risk 4: Rigid specification of clinical trial design 
 There is a risk that the way in which the field  conducts clinical trials of interventions 
will become overly rigid and fail to take into account the particular requirements of mental 
health research (arguably akin to some of the problems associated with ‘teaching to the test’ 
in education; see Chomsky & Robichaud, 2014) . This could exacerbate type II error. In an 
elegant thought experiment Cuijpers and Cristea (2015) describe how one might go about 
designing a research programme to show a novel therapy to be effective when it is not 
(capitalising on type I error). We borrow from their framework here to consider the reverse: 
the features of a research programme designed to show a novel therapy to be no better than 
standard care, when it is in fact superior. We are intentionally taking a reductio ad absurdum 
stance here.  
First, no one with any particular interest in a therapy should be allowed to evaluate it, 
ostensibly to eliminate allegiance bias but also ensuring people will not work hard to optimise 
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treatment delivery and trial data collection. Second, care should be taken not to provide 
extensive training and supervision for the novel therapy prior to starting the trial and instead 
this should be exactly matched against the treatment-as-usual arm (ignoring the fact that the 
therapists recruited into the treatment-as-usual arm have undergone extensive training in 
usual care prior to the trial and have then practised it clinically for a number of years). Third, 
to minimise measure-hacking, only a single outcome measure should be collected (despite the 
fact that we are really not sure what depression is, that multiple outcomes are valued by 
different stakeholders, and that most of our measures are flawed). Fourth,  to minimise p-
hacking and eliminate multiple comparisons, a rigid analysis protocol should be pre-specified 
with no room for data-driven modification (for example, if the primary measure is shown to 
have high rates of missingness, to have errors in its administration, or have poor reliability we 
should not move to another measure).  
Fifth, any attempts to conduct moderation analyses to unpick what works for whom 
and when should be dismissed as a fishing expedition (despite the fact that there is 
overwhelming evidence of heterogeneity in the presentation of depression). Sixth, any 
variance between sites and therapists should be ignored as noise, not as key information to 
inform successful implementation of a complex intervention. Seventh, attempts to evaluate 
mechanism of action of complex multi-component treatments should either be avoided or be 
suitably reductionist, so that the burden to participants is minimised and so that no real 
opposition to the developers’ preferred theory of change is inadvertently generated. An added 
advantage of this narrow focus of outcome, moderator and mediator measurement is that the 
trial data are of no use to any other researchers in the field for secondary analyses, so the 
principal investigator will not often be bothered by requests to share data.  
Eighth, after the trial has been conducted, the outcomes should then be entered into 
trial-level meta-analyses. Meta-regression and sub-groups analyses should be run and 
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interpreted to support the null, without making reference to issues of chronic under-powering 
that exacerbate type II error. Individual patient data meta-analysis should be avoided, as it 
can throw up complexities in conclusions about whether to recommend a treatment or not at 
the population level.  
Further, steps can be taken to maximise the chances that a treatment will fail to be 
implementable in real world practice, by focusing on maximising internal validity with no 
consideration of external validity and generalisation. An artificially ‘clean’ group of patients 
with no comorbidity and no differences in depression ‘staging’ should be recruited, ideally so 
tightly specified that these clients very rarely  present in real-world practice. A very rigid 
treatment protocol should be specified with no scope for any tailoring to different 
presentations. There should be very prescriptive requirements about setting and supervision 
throughout the trial that cannot be easily recreated in real world settings.   
 Of course, no one in the research credibility movement, and we would hope nobody at 
all,  is suggesting anything like the above would be a good way to conduct a trial in 
depression. However, there is a serious point here. The above is an extreme example of how 
to try and minimise type I error, without any consideration of type II error. Maximising 
internal validity of trials makes sense in areas of medicine where the phenomenon of interest 
is clearly operationalised, can be measured with a single outcome, the delivery of the 
intervention targeting the phenomena is simple and fixed, and implementation is not a 
challenge (e.g. see recommendations in Heneghan, Goldacre, & Mahtari, 2017). This is not 
the case in complex fields like mental health. This nuance may not always be appreciated by 
generic biomedical funding panels, who may expect mental health trials to follow the same 
ground rules as those used in ‘cleaner’, more mature areas of health research. Mental health 
trials may not be funded as a result.   
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We now make a number of recommendations to promote optimal trial design in 
mental health. The collection of multiple outcomes should be supported as a legitimate 
approach, ideally with a ‘core set’ agreed across trials. Indeed, triangulation of different 
measures of the same construct should be seen as good practice not ‘data fishing’ (e.g. 
Denzin, 1978). We agree with Guidi et al. (2018) who recommend multiple measurement of 
outcomes (clinimetrics) that move beyond simply indexing symptom relief to also cover 
social functioning, wellbeing, and patient satisfaction and cover staging variables. This broad 
array of outcomes beyond symptoms is often of particular importance to service-users (for 
examples in depression see: Zimmerman et al., 2006; Demyttenaere et al., 2015). Each 
additional outcome measure needs to add unique information to justify its inclusion (i.e. 
display incremental validity). Sensible suggestions have also been put forward by Flake and 
Fried (submitted) about selection of measures (defining the construct of interest, 
operationalising the construct, justifying the choice of measure, justifying any modifications 
to the measure, and justifying the creation of any bespoke measure) that will help preserve 
rigour.   
Trials should have broad recruitment criteria that reflect real-world presentations of 
mental health problems. Given the chronic and/or recurrent nature of depression, there needs 
to be multiple outcome measurement over a long time period (rather than rigidly pre-
specifying one time point as the primary outcome and not examining longer term benefits). A 
good example of this is follow-up analyses of the COBALT trial, which demonstrated five-
year clinical and cost-effectiveness of CBT (compared to treatment as usual) for cases of 
depression that had not previously responded to medication (Wiles et al., 2016).  
A particularly important area for progress in the field is to ensure trials are optimally 
designed to explore moderators and mediators. It may be the case that no single treatment 
will ever end up being superior for all cases of depression given its inherent heterogeneity.  It 
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is therefore of value to be able to better match the right treatment to the right presentation. A 
wide-ranging set of individual moderators should be collected (and ideally standardised 
across trials) to help establish what works for whom and when. Given clear evidence that 
staging (severity, chronicity, number of episodes) impacts on treatment response, the list of 
moderators should include staging variables (Lorenzo-Luaces, 2018; Guidi et al., 2018). 
Given increasing evidence from network psychopathology that not all symptoms of disorders 
are ‘created equal’ (e.g., Fried et al., 2017), whether particular elevations in particular 
symptom clusters predicts outcome should be examined. It is also important to capture 
contextual moderators (including therapist and service-context), which can be achieved by 
using methods from realist complex intervention science (Fletcher et al., 2016) and also 
ensuring a robust process evaluation is built into trial design (see Moore et al., 2014). 
There should be an emphasis on the development of ways of analysing moderation to 
maximise the capacity to match the right treatment to the right patient (Cohen & DeRubeis, 
2018). Robust validation of putative mediators and ways to evaluate them should occur using 
laboratory methods and only then be included in trials when they are well specified. 
Mediators and outcomes should be assessed at multiple points during treatment, given the 
importance of establishing temporal precedence and the difficulty in predicting a priori 
exactly when in treatment change will occur. Analysis methods should be developed that 
make it possible to allow for individual differences in when this change comes about, rather 
than assuming this is fixed for all individuals (for general recommendations around mediation 
analysis, see Emsley et al., 2010; Kraemer et al., 2002; Hayes & Rockwood, 2017). Trials 
should be adequately powered to conduct these mediation and moderation analyses (and 
ideally to examine site and therapist effects; Spirito et al., 2009; Kraemer & Robinson, 2005; 
Magnusson, Andersson, & Carlbring, 2018), although we recognise this may not be 
pragmatically possible in all cases. One approach might be to form large, cross-national 
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consortia to enable trials with sufficient sample sizes to be run that are powered to explore 
these issues. Such an approach is being successfully followed in other areas of psychiatric 
research (for example, the Psychiatric Genomics Consortium: see 
https://www.med.unc.edu/pgc/about-us/). 
Meta-analytic techniques that are sensitive for examining moderation at the individual 
participant rather than trial level should be utilized where possible. For example, using 
individual patient data meta-analysis, it has been demonstrated that Mindfulness Based 
Cognitive Therapy is more effective as a relapse prevention treatment for depression (relative 
to maintenance anti-depressant medication) in participants with more marked residual 
depression symptoms (Kuyken et al., 2016). Further, another individual patient data meta-
analysis in older adults found a superiority of anti-depressants to placebo only in those with a 
long illness duration and at least moderate depression severity (Nelson, Delucchi & 
Schneider, 2013). At present, individual patient data meta-analyses are hampered by the 
extensive variation in trial design and measurement, so establishing a standard set of 
moderator measures to include across different future trials will be beneficial.   
Careful consultation with patients should occur at the trial design phase to find ways 
to ensure measurement burden is not overly onerous and to maximise chances of high rates of 
data completeness (e.g., see Bodart et al, 2018). Given that this will create multi-factorial 
data sets, care should be taken at the protocol registration stage to be clear about what are 
primary and outcome measures (or what decisions rules will be used to inform selection of 
primary outcome after data collection is completed) and how analyses will be conducted. 
The correct control group should be selected based on the question of interest and 
how well developed the field is (see Gold et al., 2017), not just automatically defaulting to a 
two-arm comparison of two active therapies in all scenarios. Where the key question is to 
understand how and for whom a treatment works, it may be appropriate to use an 
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‘experimental’ control condition (for example, one that is identical to the treatment of interest 
apart from some particular processes/elements of interest). Where it is uncertain how 
effective standard care is relative to no intervention, it may be appropriate to include a third 
arm like a waitlist control (although for ethical reasons it is inappropriate to deny clients at 
risk from treatments that we do definitely know are effective; Gold et al., 2017). Where there 
is no current standard of care (for example, evaluating what to do with treatment resistant 
clients after all standard treatments have been exhausted), it may be appropriate to have a 
treatment as usual or no intervention control condition. 
Pilot trials are often conducted prior to a definitive trial to determine if it is feasible to 
run. While the recommendation is not to analyse clinical outcomes in pilot trials as they are 
under-powered (Thabane et al., 2010), there may nevertheless be other ways to evaluate 
proof-of-concept of the intervention including interpreting confidence intervals and using 
Bayesian methods (Lee et al., 2014).  There may also be merit in analysing pilot trial data at 
the individual participant level, for example assessing reliable and clinically significant 
improvement and deterioration rates (cf. Jacobson & Truax, 1991). If data are collected at 
multiple intervals (for example, weekly sessions), with the addition of a baseline phase it may 
also be possible to conduct intensive time series analyses at the individual level.  
It should be accepted as legitimate practice for intervention developers to be involved 
in evaluating them, at least in the early stages of the development pipeline. However, there is 
no way to escape the fact that treatment developers are likely to have direct and indirect 
financial and career gains if their treatment is widely adopted, meaning they are vulnerable to 
intentional or unintentional bias. When developers do evaluate their own treatments, they 
should clearly document steps they have taken to minimise allegiance bias and ensure 
equipoise between arms. For example, adversarial collaboration may be useful (where 
primary researchers who each favour different treatments jointly work on the same trial, with 
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both centres running both arms) (see Leykin & DeRubeis, 2009; Haaga, 2009). For a 
treatment to be considered well validated, while a portion of trials can be conducted by the 
treatment developers, some should be conducted by genuinely neutral research groups.  
 When funding panels review mental health trials, a specialist in this area should be 
part of the committee and also panel members from broader bio-medical fields should be 
made aware of the ‘messy’ context in which mental health operates and why this changes the 
requirements of good trial design.  
Having now reviewed the extent to which an overly-rigid focus upon reducing type I 
error might exacerbate type II error, we will now extend the focus to look at broader issues of 
research waste in the clinical psychology field. 
 
Part 2: Broadening the focus to other areas of research waste  
 Psychology to date has primarily concerned itself with problems of non-replication 
and associated QRPs that may underpin these. However, this is only one part of a broader set 
of factors contributing to research waste (see Chalmers et al., 2014; Al-Shahi et al., 2014; 
Chan et al., 2014). By shining the light solely on the replication issue in psychology, there is 
a risk that other areas of waste will be left in the dark (and therefore will not be minimised). 
We will now review other sources of waste of relevant to the development of psychological 
therapies.  
We see therapies as optimally emerging via a translational research pathway, with 
basic research informing treatment development, evaluation and then implementation.  It is 
currently recognised that a disappointingly small amount of basic science research goes on to 
inform healthcare practice in this way (Grimshaw et al., 2012) and that it takes too long  to 
move through this pathway (Morris et al., 2011), meaning treatments may be obsolete or no 
longer fit for context at the end of the process. Anything that enhances the efficiency of this 
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pipeline (and eliminates waste) will therefore be of benefit. Two key rate limiting steps  
identified in the treatment development pipeline are translating basic science insight into new 
treatments protocols (the t1 gap; ‘the valley of death’) and then ensuring that novel treatment 
protocols, shown to work in ideal settings, are implemented in a  real world context (the t2 
gap) (Cooksey, 1996; Butler, 2008; Coller & Califf, 2009). We will review ways to overcome 
these gaps. In addition, we will discuss a third issue regarding how to allow organic growth 
of psychological therapies after the development pipeline has been completed.  
These other sources of research waste are best seen as intimately intertwined with the 
research credibility movement. A thoughtful, flexible application of research credibility 
principles will help, while an overly rigid implementation of research credibility principles 
will hinder, progress in reducing research waste in each of these areas. While these issues are 
interlinked, what counts as optimal methodological rigour may look somewhat different at 
each phase of the translational pipeline (development, evaluation and implementation).  
Source of waste 1: Not optimising treatment development 
 
 Psychological therapies are complex interventions, which are not straightforward to 
develop. It is a mistake to neglect this development phase. The MRC complex intervention 
framework (Craig et al., 2006) is explicit that excessive focus upon definitive trial evaluation, 
neglecting the development, piloting, and implementation phases, can result in interventions 
that are: less likely to be effective; harder to evaluate; less likely to be implemented; and less 
likely to be worth implementing in the first place. In other words, not optimising a treatment 
prior to trial significantly inflates the risk it will not be any better than existing treatments. 
 Clark (2004) and Salkovskis (2002) both write eloquently about the systematic steps 
they followed to develop novel treatments for anxiety disorders, via a creative synergy 
between the clinic and the laboratory. There is a rapid, iterative cycle between theory 
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development, experimental science and treatment development, at the core of which is an 
attention to phenomenology when working with patients.  
 Therefore, the optimal context in which to develop new therapies is to have time and 
space to foster a creative synergy between clinical practice, research, and broader contextual 
influences. In modern day clinical-academia, this is hard to achieve for a variety of reasons. 
First, it is challenging to gain funding to develop novel treatments – funders tend to cover 
either the basic science arena or the treatment evaluation arena. Asa result, it is difficult to do 
the iterative development work to translate basic science findings into a novel treatment to 
evaluate. Second, it is difficult (in a UK context at least) to have a split academic and clinical 
post. After clinical training individuals are typically forced to choose either a pure research or 
clinical pathway. This mean researchers lose their links to ‘grass roots’ practice, both 
inhibiting their creativity and inflating the risk they will develop a treatment that is not fit for 
real world context. The UK National Institute of Health Research (NIHR) has recognized this 
as a significant problem for allied health professionals (NIHR trainee coordinating centre, 
2017). Third, if an individual has found a way to develop a novel treatment with encouraging 
preliminary data, it can then be challenging to publish these findings. Journals often view this 
development work as insufficiently robust, so reject it at the review phase.  
These factors may impact on the career choices that researchers make. Scientists may 
be put off becoming treatment developers at all, instead choosing to operate in the basic 
science arena or the trials arena. Alternatively, researchers may rush the development of an 
intervention and take this to RCT evaluation before it is optimised (both in terms of how it 
works and how to implement it effectively).  This then increases the odds of finding a null 
result in the subsequent trial (even if that trial is conducted in a way that is fully compliant 
with research credibility guidelines). 
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To minimise this source of waste, greater emphasis should be placed on systematic 
treatment development. The MRC guidelines for complex intervention development can be a 
helpful starting point to follow here (Craig et al., 2006). These recommend: being clear what 
the treatment is targeting; building a coherent underlying theoretical basis to the treatment; 
having a clear, well specified protocol that others can follow; and being clear how change 
will be measured. Further, any uncertainties about whether the planned definitive trial 
evaluation can be conducted (including recruitment, retention, intervention acceptability and 
feasibility, likely effect size and variability) should be resolved in piloting and feasibility 
work before proceeding to evaluation. These guidelines are of optimal utility when they are 
seen as a useful set of guiding principles which can be adapted to each specific intervention 
context, rather than a prescriptive set of rules that must be followed in a ‘tick-box’ fashion.  
Moreover, the MRC guidelines are arguably under-specified as to how complex 
protocols are optimally designed. The steps outlined by Clark (2004) can be particularly 
helpful when developing psychological therapies: i) use clinical interviews and experimental 
paradigms to identify core mechanisms triggering and maintaining a disorder; ii) construct 
theoretical accounts as to why these mechanisms do not self-correct; iii) use experimental 
studies to test these hypothesized maintaining factors; and iv) develop specialised treatments 
that reverse these maintaining factors (sometimes by direct translation of experimental 
manipulation procedures used in the earlier step). We would add to this the need to test 
evidence for an underlying mechanism by establishing it is cross-sectionally and 
prospectively linked to the target outcome using questionnaire and experience-sampling 
designs, and showing that manipulating it in the laboratory and in real world settings changes 
the target outcome (Dunn et al., 2017). Well conducted basic science that thoughtfully rather 
than rigidly follows research credibility principles is likely to be helpful in this regard, as it 
will help ensure that any mechanisms that treatments target are more likely to have a sound 
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evidence-based footing. The notion of ‘full-cycle’ evaluation from social psychology may 
optimise the utility of such work (e.g. Mortensen & Cialdini, 2010). This recommends that 
researchers start with naturalistic observation to establish the present of an effect in the real 
world. They then develop a theory to determine what processes underlie this effect and use 
experimental methods to verify this theory. Critically, they then return to observational work 
in the natural environment to corroborate the experimental findings. 
Case series methods can be particularly helpful in the preliminary evaluation of 
treatments, being ideally suited to assess treatment acceptability and feasibility and provide 
preliminary evidence of effectiveness and proof-of-concept without requiring significant 
investment of resources (Kazdin, 2011; Morley, 2017). Use of a randomised multiple 
baseline design (randomising individuals to different lengths of baseline phase before starting 
treatment) helps to differentiate between a genuine treatment effect and natural recovery over 
time or other confounding factors (Kratochwill & Levin, 2010). Intensive time series analyses 
have adequate power to test statistically the efficacy of an intervention for an individual 
participant (Borckardt et al., 2008). By replicating findings across a series of individual cases, 
this begins to assess whether findings are generalizable (for example using single-case meta-
analytic techniques; Jamshidi et al., 2018). There is potential for multi-centre collaboration 
here, with the same interventions being evaluated in different settings to explore context 
effects and to ‘road test’ implementation issues. It is possible to refine the intervention 
between case series waves, allowing for rapid optimisation of treatment protocols.   
Case series can also help identify treatment non-responders, who can be overlooked 
within the overall effect of a group-based design. Case series can be further enhanced by 
incorporating qualitative methods, allowing for detailed exploration of patient views on 
feasibility, acceptability, efficacy, mechanisms of action, reasons for non-response, and ways 
in which the treatment can be improved (Onghena, Maes & Heyvaert, 2018). It is also 
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possible to estimate pre to post effect sizes at the group level in these case series, which 
ideally should be at least of a large magnitude according to Cohen’s rules of thumb (Cohen, 
1988).  
Case series continuation rules can be pre-specified (e.g., the treatment is acceptable to 
patients and a majority will complete a minimum acceptable course; at least 50% of 
participants show reliable and clinically significant change; on average a large effect size is 
observed; therapists can be trained to deliver with minimum adequate fidelity) to determine 
whether a protocol needs further refinement or is ready to proceed to RCT evaluation. If 
required, further iterations of the protocol can be made and the case series can be repeated on 
the optimised protocol before proceeding to the trial stage. Arguably a definitive trial should 
be conducted only where there is little uncertainty that the treatment will be effective.  The 
purpose of a definitive trial should be to establish how the treatment performs relative to 
other treatments (Clark, 2004). 
Funders should ensure they have ‘balanced portfolios of investment’ that fall in 
different places on the translational pipeline (critically including treatment development and 
not just focusing on treatment evaluation). There should be more explicit consideration of 
value for money in the work funded (for example, adaptation of value of information analysis 
methods from health economics; Tuffaha, Gordon & Scuffham, 2014). Wherever possible, 
joint clinical-academic posts should be supported to allow treatment developers to be 
clinically active whilst they develop new treatments. In a UK context, this would be best 
served by joint posts between universities and the NHS, similar to those available to medical 
doctors.   
Journal editors and reviewers should be encouraged to publish development work 
where it is done to adequate standards and reported in an appropriately conservative fashion 
given its preliminary nature. For example, journals should be willing to consider rigorously 
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conducted case series using intensive time series analyses that follow published 
methodological guidelines; thoughtfully analysed qualitative studies of stakeholder views of 
the problem; and pilot/feasibility studies that establish the planned definitive trial can be 
conducted and which include appropriate proof of concept analyses given sample size 
limitations.  
Source of waste 2: Neglecting implementation 
 There is an acknowledged divide between clinical work in an ‘ivory tower’ academic 
setting and at the clinical ‘coal face’ (Stirman, Gutner, Langdon & Grahm, 2016). The 
argument is that treatments are developed in the ivory tower that can only work with a 
carefully screened, homogeneous group of patients where therapy is delivered under ideal 
conditions. These treatments are not always implementable in real world settings, and if they 
can be implemented they are significantly less effective. This may reflect two distinct 
underlying issues: i) the treatments designed in the ‘ivory tower’ may not actually be fit for 
the real world service context as the developers did not consult widely enough at the design 
stage; ii) the means by which we are disseminating the treatment into the real world context 
are not optimised (therapist selection, training and supervision; service context). Each of 
these issues raises slightly different challenges and responses. 
With regards to how to design an intervention that is fit for the real world context, it is 
important to consider implementation from the outset rather than view it as something that is 
thought about only after a trial has shown that a treatment works in ideal settings. This can be 
facilitated by ensuring key stakeholders such as patients, clinicians and commissioners are 
consulted at all stages (Dunn, 2017).  In the UK, the NIHR INVOLVE programme has helped 
ensure that patient consultation is now embedded into all stages of the research process in 
NIHR funded projects (INVOLVE, 2012).  There are emerging examples of intervention co-
design in the mental health field, where patients and researchers work together to develop the 
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treatment (e.g. see Nakarada-Kordic et al., 2017; Larkin, Boden & Newton, 2015).While the 
benefits of patient involvement are only starting to be empirically evaluated, and a sense of 
how best to use PPI input is still evolving, results are encouraging (see Brett et al., 2014)  
There is a range of formal frameworks that can guide this initial design process. For 
example, the intervention mapping approach – a framework pioneered in health psychology 
to aid the effective development and roll out of public health interventions – emphasises the 
importance of this co-design process (Bartholomew et al., 2016). It can be particularly useful 
to have multiple stakeholder perspectives to help resolve conflicts of interest.  
Likely affordability and cost-effectiveness of an intervention should be considered 
from the outset. There is little point in developing a novel therapy that is too expensive to 
implement in its target context and/or that is worse value for money than existing treatments. 
Therefore, health economic methods should be incorporated from an early stage, including 
detailed costing of intervention delivery and development of health economic models to look 
at likely long term cost-effectiveness. Ideally these models should take a broad societal 
perspective and consider likely savings over the longer term, given the widespread impacts of 
mental health and the chronic, relapsing course of presentations. Arguably, only treatments 
that emerge as likely to fall under acceptable absolute cost thresholds and to be at least 
neutral in terms of cost-effectiveness relative to standard care should be allowed to proceed to 
definitive trial phase. 
 With regards to how to disseminate an appropriate treatment into the real-world 
context after it has been trialled, implementation science perspectives may be helpful. 
Implementation studies focus on the rates and quality of use of evidence-based approaches, 
rather than whether those evidence based approaches are clinically effective in their own 
right (Bauer et al., 2015). Methods used in such implementation research can include both 
process evaluation (evaluating implementation without any direct intention to change the 
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ongoing process) and formative evaluation (evaluating implementation and feeding back to 
the implementation team to try and enhance ongoing practice) (Bauer et al., 2015). If it is not 
possible to conduct formal implementation controlled trials in a real-world settings, 
interrupted time series designs may be appropriate (measurement of outcome occurs at 
multiple time points before and after the implementation effort) (Bauer et al., 2015). One 
example of a helpful framework derived from implementation science is Normalisation 
Process Theory (May, 2013), which discusses ways to ensure that a health care intervention 
becomes a routine part of clinical practice over the long term. In particular, it is useful to 
think of the sense-making people do when first tasked with implementing a new practice, the 
relational work that is necessary to build and sustain a community of practice around a 
complex intervention, the operational work that helps individuals enact a set of practices, and 
the appraisal work that individuals do when evaluating the impacts of a set of practices on 
themselves and others. This methodology has been increasingly applied in the complex 
interventions field to aid intervention development and implementation (May et al., 2018). 
In addition, there needs to be further research into the best methods to select, train and 
supervise effective therapists for a given treatment approach, how to ensure ongoing 
assessment and monitoring of therapist competence, and what counts as optimal dosage for 
treatment (e.g., see Shafran et al., 2009). Analysis of routine registry data after a treatment 
has been rolled out can provide a ‘natural experiment’ to identify what factors predict 
successful implementation (for example, looking at differences in outcomes between 
therapists and site and seeing what underpins these differences; e.g., Clark et al., 2018). As 
this relies on large scale roll out of therapy provision, it may be viable only in contexts with 
well-developed public mental health systems that capture routine registry data.  
Source of waste 3: Inhibiting organic evolution of treatment 
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A neglected issue is how to allow complex interventions to evolve after the definitive 
trials evaluating them have been completed. The delivery of most drug and biomedical 
procedures are relatively fixed. In contrast, psychological therapies often continue to be 
refined in the years after the definitive trials have been conducted, informed by clinicians’ 
experiences of implementation and through integration of other non-trial sources of empirical 
evidence. For example, CBT for depression has been enriched over the years by mechanistic 
insights in basic science being translated into novel interventions (e.g. rumination being 
identified as a key maintenance factor; Watkins, 2008). Strictly speaking, integrating these 
techniques into routine CBT practice means practice is no longer truly evidence-based, as the 
protocols have not been trialled with these novel elements included. However, these 
adaptations are clearly evidence informed. It would be counter-productive to prevent these 
techniques from being used.  
What tends to happen is that when innovation of the above kind happens, researchers 
are nudged into labelling each of these adaptations as a distinct new therapy, as this is the 
only way to gain funding to develop and evaluate them properly. They go on to conduct new 
trials, for example head-to-head evaluations to see if the new treatment is clearly better than 
what came before. This process is resource intensive and slow. Given the incremental rather 
than stepwise nature of these refinements in some cases, it is unlikely that anything other than 
small effect size differences will be found (and very large and costly trials would be needed 
to demonstrate this). This proliferation of multiple protocols may not be helpful for the field, 
not least because clinicians then end up having to learn and choose between multiple 
protocols (when it would be more efficient to train them in a universal way of working that 
could be tailored based on client presentation).  
Rapid, resource-efficient ways of refining existing treatments like CBT need to be 
developed that avoid this artificial proliferation of ‘distinct’ protocols and allow existing 
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protocols to continue to develop rather than calcify. It is not viable to go through the 
conventional trial pipeline for each new adaptation that is made, comparing them to the 
standard protocol. It is likely that each adaptation will result in a ‘marginal gain’ and 
probably only for the subset of clients where that particular mechanism/feature is present, 
meaning head-to-head comparisons are unlikely to show superiority. We are unsure of the 
optimal way to achieve this goal, and here make some tentative suggestions. One approach 
could be stepped wedge ‘training’ trial designs in real world settings (Hemming, Haines, 
Chilton, Girling & Lilford, 2014). For example, CBT clinicians (such as high intensity 
Improving Access to Psychological Therapies [IAPT] workforces) could be trained in novel 
additional techniques to add to the standard depression protocols at the cluster level, and the 
outcomes be evaluated. Another approach could be to conduct single session experimental 
designs, for example adding a novel session into existing treatment and carefully monitoring 
the impact this has on outcomes (see Clark, 2004). Further, there may be value in adaptive 
rolling designs, where multiple treatment options are tested simultaneously and sequential 
Bayesian analysis removes poorly performing arms (see Blackwell, Woud, Margraf & 
Schonbrodt, 2018). However, such an approach may not be easily operable except in the e-
health domain. A potentially more radical solution is to move to a ‘process-based’ approach 
to evaluating therapies. The emphasis is on identifying the underlying mechanisms that 
maintain distress and what therapeutic procedures are effective at altering these mechanisms, 
irrespective of what school of therapy is being practised (see Hoffmann & Hayes, 2019).   
Additional sources of waste 
There are a range of other sources of waste that are not specific to clinical 
psychology, so we only briefly allude to them here. There is emerging recognition that the 
current grant system may not optimise efficiency: the efforts researchers make in writing 
unsuccessful proposals more than offset the gains made from selecting the best proposals, 
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especially when only a few proposals can be funded (Gross & Berstrom, 2019). There is now 
interest in alternative funding methods like partial lotteries or funding researchers based on 
past scientific success, each with different pros and cons (Gross & Bergstrom, 2019; 
Smaldino et al., 2019). While we have not seen anything written on the topic, there may be 
significant waste in publication practices also, for example, time wasted writing multiple 
submissions of the same piece to different journals, working down the journal impact factor 
hierarchy to ensure papers are published in the most career-enhancing outlets. Arguably it is 
best practice to publish more rapidly. There are also sources of waste in the regulation of 
science, for example inefficient administrative process around gaining ethics approval, 
negotiating intellectual property, and difficulties in optimising use of routine registry data due 
to failure to implement electronic records, to name but a few (see Al-Shahi Salman et al., 




In this article we have discussed the evolution of the research credibility movement, 
which we agree is very helpful in eliminating type I error in fields characterised by high 
degrees of theoretical innovation but limited rigorous evaluation of these ideas. However, we 
have argued there are risks to inhibiting innovation and creativity in clinical psychology if 
these principles are applied too rigidly by funders, journals or scientists. These include 
inhibiting accidental discovery; placing treatment and theory development in a scientific 
vacuum and neglecting broader cultural influences; over interpreting non-replications as true 
negative findings; devaluing exploratory analyses; and conducting rigid clinical trials that 
follow a biomedical ideal and fail to take into account the heterogeneity of mental health.  
We have also reviewed broader contributors to research waste when developing 
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psychological therapies. These include not investing in initial treatment development, not 
optimising treatment implementation, and not allowing treatments to grow organically.  
The net product of all these factors could be a significant reduction in the extent and 
the pace of innovation that occurs in the clinical field. Fewer novel treatments will emerge 
and those that do could take longer to move through the translational pipeline.  Our hope is 
that by discussing these issues the benefits of the research credibility movement can be 
gained without leading to inadvertent costs. Moreover, we hope that the broader translational 
pipeline can be optimised. While we have largely restricted our discussion to depression, it 
may be that many of these concerns would be relevant for other areas of the clinical 
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